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I. INTRODUCTION
The volume of medical malpractice litigation in the United States
has increased rapidly since 1950. An upward trend in personal injury
litigation, increased expectations about good health and "miracle cures,",
and the opportunities to receive substantial judgments for damages2
have greatly fueled lawyers' and patients' decisions to sue all categories
of health care providers. As a result of the frequency and severity of
malpractice litigation, commercial insurance carriers raised the cost of
liability insurance for health care providers, 3 which compelled the prov-
iders to pass along these costs to their patients. By 1974-1975, a
malpractice "crisis" culminated throughout the nation, a crisis described
by the Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice as:
A problem of national concern that vitally affects the way in which health care is
rendered in this country. The malpractice problem is like a proliferation of cancerous
cells which has spread throughout the health care system. Its consequences ... are
indeed profound.4
As the health care system headed toward a possible collapse in the
mid-1970s, consumer groups, physicians, hospitals and insurance com-
panies began pressuring state officials across the country to fix the
shortcomings in the existing malpractice system. State legislatures thus
undertook an examination of several alternative approaches to the prob-
lem, ranging from tort reform measures to expanding the sources for
malpractice liability insurance.5 Two principal alternatives which several
states implemented were pre-trial screening panels and arbitration.7
These mechanisms were aimed at encouraging malpractice settlements
and fostering more equitable claims procedures outside the traditional
court system, for the benefit of all parties involved.'
1. P. CARLIN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PRE-TRIAL SCREENING PANELS: A REvIEw
OF THE EVIDENCE 9 (1980). Miracle cures refer to expectations that doctors can treat
successfully even the most difficult medical conditions.
2. See id. at 10.
3. See id. For example, average premiums increased two-fold during 1974-1977.
4. Id. at 8.
5. Id. at 13.
6. See id. at 15. Presently 26 states operate screening panels.
7. For background information on arbitration, see generally Ladimer, Solomon &
Mulvihill, Experience in Medical Malpractice Arbitration, 2 J. LEGAL MED. 433, 444
(1981). Presently 14 states operate arbitration mechanisms.
8. See P. CARLIN, supra note 1, at 12.
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The successes and failures of alternative dispute resolution in the
medical malpractice forum have had a significant impact on efforts to
revitalize the current United States health care system. The focus of
this Note is to examine the use of screening panels and arbitration of
malpractice claims, principally from the perspective of health care
providers, including physicians, hospitals and Health Maintenance Or-
ganizations (HMOs). 9 Issues for consideration are whether alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms are effective in attaining the goals of
health care professionals and institutions, and how screening panels and
arbitration, if beneficial, can be better used. The position of this Note'
is that to varying extents alternative dispute resolution can benefit and
sustain the interests of both health care providers and their patients.
As a result these two mechanisms, when implemented with reforms, can
improve the overall structure of the health care system.
A. Historical Overview of the Malpractice Problem
The malpractice crisis of the 1970s hit health care providers hard
across the United States. For example, in New York State, from 1970
through 1974, the number of cases filed against physicians rose from
564 to 1,200, and the average cost of settling a malpractice claim during
the decade climbed from $6,000 to $23,400.10 Consequently, malpractice
insurance premiums soared, causing hospitals in some cases to pay six
times the amount of liability insurance in 1977 that they paid in 1974.11
When the increased cost of health care threatened the stability of the
entire health care industry, providers and patients turned to their re-
spective state governments for immediate relief.
B. Initial Responses by Governmental Authorities: Screening Panels
and Arbitration
When the states began tackling the medical malpractice crisis, two
general goals were pursued, both of which still exist today. The first
goal consisted of reducing the number of malpractice claims filed, as
well as decreasing the time and expense involved in conventional liti-
gation. 2 The second goal was to reduce the awards given to plaintiffs
in malpractice actions. 3 Various proposals were considered, including
9. For a general discussion on Health Maintenance Organizations, see B. FURROW,
S. JOHNSON, T. JOST & R. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH LAW 392-94 (1987) [hereinafter HEALTH
LAW]. Health Maintenance Organizations are health care organizations which administer
care to patients on a prepaid, as opposed to a fee for service, basis. Id.
10. See P. CARLIN, supra note 1 at 9-10.
11. Id. at 10.
12. Id. at 3-4; Terry, The Technical and Conceptual Flaws of Medical Malpractice




substantive tort law changes such as shortened statutes of limitations,
dollar caps on malpractice verdicts, stricter expert witness rules, and
control over attorney contingency fees.14 Two of the proposals examined
came from the area of non-conventional litigation: pre-trial screening
panels and arbitration.
Screening panels are designed to supplement the traditional legal
system. Panels consisting of lawyers, doctors, lay persons, or judicial
officers hear cases and reach opinions on issues of liability and sometimes
damages. To influence negotiation and party settlement as well as to
protect the constitutional right to a jury trial, all screening panels place
emphasis upon access to the courts for final disposition.'5 Arbitration,
on the other hand, avoids the traditional court system by providing a
parallel private forum for malpractice claim resolution. Frequently,
arbitration panels have the power to makefinal determinations of liability
which are legally enforceable.16
II. HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS AND THE NEED FOR
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
By implementing screening panels and arbitration, state governments
believed the goals of reducing the frequency and severity of malpractice
claims could be attained. From the point of view of individual and
institutional health care providers, however, these goals have been only
partially achieved in the last decade. Nevertheless, alternative dispute
resolution for health care providers remains an important and useful
concept, in theory as well as in practice.
A. The Goals of Health Care Providers When Resolving Malpractice
Claims
Health care providers continue to share many of the same goals which
state legislatures advocate in alleviating the malpractice problem per-
sisting throughout the 1980s. Health care providers desire to remain in
business, and vital state interests are served in maintaining community
access to health care resources and services. Consequently, all parties
benefit from the reduction in the frequency and severity of lawsuits
against physicians and hospitals because lower costs from decreasing
insurance rates enable providers to continue the delivery of health care
services. 7
14. Id. at 13.
15. See Ladimer, Solomon & Mulvihill, supra note 7, at 444.
16. Id.
17. See P. CARLIN, supra note 1, at 3-4.
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The principal goals of health care providers revolve around the need
to reduce frivolous lawsuits and to settle with plaintiffs clear claims of
provider liability. 8 Providers also desire to keep claims away from jury
evaluation so as to diminish high damage awards, 9 thereby reducing
the high cost of insurance premiums. Furthermore, if the costs of
defending malpractice actions diminish, the quality of health care ad-
ministered by providers may in fact improve. Doctors will focus more
attention on administering health care rather than on malpractice mat-
ters. Thus, screening panels and arbitration, by removing claims from
the traditional litigation process, potentially foreclose severe provider
liability while enhancing the quality of patient care.
B. Screening Panels and Arbitration: The Basics Behind Non-Conven-
tional Litigation
The structure of screening panels varies by jurisdiction. For example,
New York State has a panel where a supreme court (court of first
instance) justice or retired justice, an attorney, and a physician determine
liability,' while New Mexico's panel includes three health care providers
and three attorneys, with a chairperson attorney on hand to vote in case
of a tie." Moreover, procedural devices such as the use of panel findings
as evidence in a later trial also differ across jurisdictions. In New Jersey,
panel findings are admissible at a subsequent trial;' yet, in New York,
panel determinations are admissible at trial only if decided unanimously.
3
While screening panels can possess structural and procedural differ-
ences, they are uniformly used to screen out frivolous lawsuits and
determine meritorious malpractice claims which should be settled quickly.
Additionally, if parties desire to proceed to trial, panels can make certain
recommendations which may aid the court in resolving the dispute.
Given the purpose of the panels, however, several states implement
penalties against screening panel losers who institute subsequent liti-
gation. ' The goal is to strongly encourage the less expensive and less
administratively difficult pre-trial process.
The other mechanism of alternative dispute resolution used by several
states, the impartial arbitration process, shares many similarities with
medical malpractice screening panels. As is the case with screening
18. See Terry, supra note 12, at 572.
19. M. REDISH, LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CRISIS:
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 13 (1977).
20. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148a (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1988).
21. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-5-17, 41-5-20 (1986).
22. N.J. Sup. CT. R. 4:21-6(e) (1988).
23. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148a (McKinney 1983).





panels, the structure of arbitration varies across jurisdictions. For ex-
ample, Alaska's panel consists of three members: one designated by the
claimant, one designated by a health care provider, and one (a chair-
person) designated by mutual agreement.21 The Pennsylvania arbitration
panel consists of three different members made up of one health care
provider, one attorney, and one layperson.26 It is important to note,
however, that no state currently requires compulsory arbitrdtion for
medical malpractice claims.
Like screening panels, medical malpractice arbitration systems attempt
to reduce the overall costs of resolving malpractice disputes. However,
while screening panels are designed to screen out nonmeritorious claims
and find meritorious ones which can be settled expeditiously, arbitration
is geared more toward finally resolving patient-provider disputes. In
essence, arbitration seeks to replace the conventional malpractice trial
process with final decisions reached quickly, economically, and confi-
dentially.2 Screening panels, in contrast to arbitration, seek to assist or
supplement jury trials.'
C. Screening Panels and Arbitration: Advantages and Disadvantages
to Health Care Providers
For health care providers, screening panels possess some basic ad-
vantages and disadvantages. First, the panels are less formal and less
time consuming than the conventional adversarial process, which keeps
down malpractice costs for providers.29 Second, screening panels con-
sisting of attorneys and health care professionals are usually better
informed on malpractice issues than lay juries, which leads to more
accurate decisions. 3' If such decisions are more reasoned or thoroughly
examined, providers will be less susceptible to the whims of sympathetic
jurors, who often lack the necessary expertise to determine malpractice
liability in many complex cases. As a result, provider insurance rates
will likely decrease, with a greater consistency in favorable panel
decisions.31
The principal disadvantage of screening panels for physicians and
hospitals lies in the fact that panels will only delay dispute resolution,
because plaintiffs will proceed to trial anyway in the absence of a
binding panel decision. Hence, it may cost even more for a provider to
25. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535(0 (1986).
26. PA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 40, § 1301.308 (Purdon Supp. 1987).
27. Sayakan, Arbitration and Screening Panels: Recent Experience and Trends, 17
FORUM 682, 685 (1982).
28. HEALTH LAw, supra note 9, at 280.
29. See P. CARLIN, supra note 1, at 15.
30. HEALTH LAW, supra note 9, at 280.
31. See P. CARLIN, supra note 1.
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defend an action that proceeds through the panel system and then to
trial. Another provider concern is that screening panels often favor
health care professionals, thereby raising the question of bias or prejudice
against plaintiffs. Such accusations create time delays in the panel
dispute resolution process, which again translates into increased expenses
for provider-defendants.
The advantages which arbitration brings to health care providers, as
well as plaintiffs in the action, include the speedier handling of claims,
relaxed rules of evidence, and narrow grounds for appealing panel
decisions. 2 This latter circumstance benefits providers because plaintiffs
will have difficulty appealing liability or damage determinations upon
favorable rulings. The panels also have an advantage in that they allow
both parties to present their case to qualified experts. For providers,
this advantage becomes especially useful when fellow health care profes-
sionals administer or sit on the arbitration tribunals.
Although arbitration reduces the caseload burden on courts and enables
fact-finding to take place apart from courtroom theatrics,33 disadvantages
do exist. For provider-defendants, the biggest disadvantage is that ar-
bitration encourages nuisance suits or excess filing of frivolous claims.3
Essentially, where arbitration proceedings are available, a claimant has
nothing to lose by trying to win at arbitration with a claim that otherwise
would be dismissed in court. The result is that providers will potentially
have to litigate an action twice if they choose to appeal what they
believe is a plaintiff's undeserved arbitration victory, a situation which
can become very costly.3"
D. Note: The Constitutionality of Arbitration Provisions
One other important concern involves the due process rights of a
claimant to seek a jury trial and avoid alternative dispute resolution.
As the focus of this Note is on health care providers and not patients,
a full examination of constitutional rights is inappropriate for present
discussion. It should be noted, however, that courts have held voluntary
arbitration provisions of state malpractice statutes to be consistent with
the constitutional guarantee of jury trials. 6 Suffice it to say, screening
panels and arbitration provisions are constitutional in most circumstances.37
32. See Sayakan, supra note 27, at 684.
33. Id. at 684.
34. Silas, Medical Arbitration is on a Rocky Road, 10 A.B.A. BAR LEADER 9 (1984).
35. Id. Undeserved victories result when panels are not fully informed in evaluating
cases. Maryland's arbitration panel is an example of the variation level in panel experts.
36. See Morris v. Metriyakool, 418 Mich. 423, 344 N.W.2d 736 (1984). McLean v.
Hunter, 486 So. 2d 816 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1986) (upholding constitutionality of
submitting malpractice claims to medical review panels).
37. See generally M. REDISH supra 19; Note, Constitutional Standards of Review




III. RESOLVING MALPRACTICE DISPUTES WITH
SCREENING PANELS AND ARBITRATION:
MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS IN PRACTICE
In practice, screening panels and arbitration have achieved several of
the above-mentioned goals of individual and institutional health care
providers. 8 Furthermore, patients have benefitted in many respects from
resolving malpractice claims outside the conventional litigation process.
Several goals of both parties, however, have yet to reach satisfactory
levels. The following sections examine some of the screening panel and
arbitration programs implemented, focusing on the overall effectiveness
of such programs in alleviating the malpractice problem.
A. Screening Panels and the Attainment of Health Care Providers'
Goals
1. Early Studies. In the 1970s, the first screening panels were es-
tablished as legislative responses to the malpractice crisis. One of the
early studies done to measure the effectiveness of screening panels was
the 1977 study of Philip and Faust for the Institute of Judicial Admin-
istration. Essentially, the authors concluded through interviews that
panel findings appeared to be impartial and fair.1 Philip and Faust
stated, however, that not enough data had been analyzed to declare
with certainty screening panel effects on the rate of claim disposition
or insurance premium reduction."'
Although early studies such as Philip and Faust's did not firmly
provide vital information on screening panels' ability to reduce the flow
of frivolous claims, results in some jurisdictions indicate that the panels
encouraged settlements and dismissals. For example, in New Mexico,
settlements followed in seventy-three percent of the cases where negli-
gence was found, and in seventy-three percent of the cases where no
negligence was found, cases were subsequently dropped or dismissed.
4 2
In comparison, fewer settlements occurred when cases proceeded to trial
without panel review.43 In New Jersey, however, the authors found that
many parties were bypassing the voluntary screening panels because
such panels had "no teeth."" Consequently, a plaintiff with a poor claim
could nevertheless proceed to litigation in New Jersey because screening
38. See Terry, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
39. C. PHILIP & R. FAUST, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE PANELS IN FouR STATES passim
(1977).
40. Id. at 39.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 26.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 30-32.
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panels, often plagued with staffing problems, had no authority to dispose
of nonmeritorious claims. 5
2. The Carlin Study. In 1980, Peter Carlin of the Intergovernmental
Health Policy Project produced a much more thorough evaluation of
medical malpractice screening panels than that in Philip and Faust's
study. Carlin's study focused on how the structure and impact of panels
were meeting the basic goals of screening out and disposing of costly
malpractice claims."6 Carlin found that despite structural differences
across jurisdictions, panel systems in many states have reduced the
volume of malpractice cases that ordinarily proceed to litigation. Ad-
ditionally, Carlin's results indicated that screening panels render prompt
decisions; hence, they resolve liability disputes quicker than conventional
litigation.47
For example, in 1976 through 1978, New York's panel recommen-
dations resulted in a settlement rate before trial of sixty-six percent.48
In Hawaii, seventy-two percent of the cases which found provider liability
at the screening level were settled, and fifty-four percent of the cases
finding no provider liability were dropped.49 Furthermore, in New Jersey,
panel decisions were rendered in one day or even in a few hours.' As
Carlin's evaluations in New Mexico, Hawaii, and Wisconsin indicate,
the informal nature of the proceedings also was found to help the pace
of claim resolution from the reporting of the incident to panel
determination."
Although Carlin notes problems in many states, most involving delays
in panel selections and proceedings, 2 health care providers have to be
encouraged by the results of panels in several locations. If less disputes
are reaching the courts and claims are being settled quickly, malpractice
awards and litigation costs are bound to decrease for provider-defendants.
Perhaps the most important statistic noted by Carlin, however, is that
at the time of his study, health care providers were winning nearly
eighty percent of all screening panel decisions. 3 Consequently, providers
are put in an advantageous position to force settlement or abandonment
of claims by the opposition,54 with the added bonus of potential penalties
being administered against those plaintiffs who appeal losing verdicts.
45. See id. at 32.
46. See P. CARLIN, supra note 1, passim.
47. Id. at 39.
48. Id. at 31.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 34.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 32.
53. Id. at 29.
54. Id. at 32.
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Such a rate of provider success, however, leads to accusations of bias
on screening panels, especially where health care providers make up
the majority of panels. Consequently, plaintiffs with potentially valid
claims feel helpless and angry because they believe they will not be
compensated for a provider's negligence. Such a situation can work as
a disadvantage to providers, principally in those jurisdictions where
patients are most able to bypass a panel's recommendation without any
disincentives for doing so." As a result, providers and patients remain
adversaries, which only inhibits negotiations for cost-reducing settlements
and claim resolutions.
3. Current Evaluations. Presently, there are a few evaluations which
expand on Carlin's findings. Two states where the usage of medical
malpractice screening panels has been examined are Maryland 6 and
Virginia. 7
In Maryland, malpractice claims in excess of the limit established by
the District Court's concurrent jurisdiction must be submitted to the
Health Claims Arbitration Office (HCAO), which functions as a pretrial
screening mechanism.58 The panel which hears the case consists of an
attorney, a health care provider, and a lay person. "The panel is not
required to follow formal rules of evidence. However, it does have the
authority to determine defendant liability and to award damages if
appropriate.""
The results of the panel's ten year existence show that only ten to
fifteen percent of panel decisions are actually tried in the circuit courts
on appeal, 60 which points to a reduction in the existing logjam currently
facing the courts.61 Also, Maryland's statute62 requires a certificate of
merit be filed showing the defendant doctor deviated from the standard
of care and caused the plaintiff's injury. This device has served to
reduce the number of claims filed by fifty percent in 1986.63 Panel
awards, however, have not been reduced, as panels are often more
generous than their jury counterparts." Finally, claim resolution is fre-
quently delayed, though not to the levels of traditional litigation, because
55. See C. PHILIP & R. FAUST, supra note 39, at 30-33, 39.
56. Heller, Health Care Arbitration System in Maryland Still Evokes Controversy,
1 Altern. Dis. Res. Rep. (BNA) 219 (Sept. 17, 1987).
57. See generally Daughtrey & Smith, Medical Malpractice Review Panels in Op-
eration in Virginia, 19 U. RICH. L. REv. 273 (1985).
58. Maryland Health Claims Arbitration Act, MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 3-2A-02 (Supp. 1987).
59. See Heller, supra note 56.
60. See id. In Maryland, 40 percent of panel decisions are appealed; 10 to 15 percent
of these decisions are actually tried again.
61. Id.
62. Maryland Health Claims Arbitration Act, MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 3-2A-04 (Supp. 1987).
63. See Heller, supra note 56, at 220.
64. Id. at 219.
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parties do not adhere to time limitations (for serving answers, selecting
panel members) imposed by the Maryland Act.65
Determining whether the Maryland system is successful depends on
whom is asked. Attorneys on both sides see the panel process as an
extra step resulting in double litigation, while physicians favor the system
because on the whole, few cases reach juries." For some physicians, the
process would work much better if the panels were given more authority,
and doctors were willing to spend the time reviewing the conduct of
their colleagues. Overall, however, the system seems to be eliminating
meritless cases,67 which ultimately benefits providers and the burdened
court system.
In Virginia, the Medical Malpractice Act of 1976, amended in 1984,"
which was the focus of Daughtrey and Smith's evaluation, 69 also estab-
lished review panels with the purpose of containing the cost of medical
malpractice insurance by keeping clearly meritorious and frivolous claims
out of the court system. Like Maryland, the panel is comprised of
attorneys, health care providers, and laypersons. Moreover, the statute
designates that at least one provider on the panel represent the medical
specialty involved in the malpractice claim. 70
In reviewing Virginia's screening panels, Daughtrey and Smith con-
cluded that the system is perceived as fostering the goals of speed and
cost containment in resolving disputes arising out of malpractice alle-
gations." While the authors suggest more data is needed to judge the
panels' full effectiveness, it is evident that at least on the issue of
burdens to participating parties, panels do not cause oppressive delays
in the final resolution of malpractice disputes. 72 This finding is crucial
for providers since plaintiffs will stay with the panel procedure instead
of proceeding to courts that possess sympathetic juries. Additionally,
without delays, plaintiffs will have difficulty arguing that time-consuming
panels serve to infringe on constitutional rights to trial.7"
In conclusion, screening panels appear to reduce the number of
malpractice claims which ultimately proceed to litigation. If providers
can somehow keep the panels free of accusations of bias, they should
subsequently benefit from this mechanism. 4
65. Id.
66. Id. at 222.
67. Id. at 220.
68. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.1 (Repl. Vol. 1984 & Supp. 1988).
69. See Daughtrey & Smith, supra note 57.
70. Id. at 292.
71. Id. at 298.
72. Id. at 296.
73. Id. For an example of a case holding that panel delay is unconstitutional, see
Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa. 385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980).
74. Of course, it is arguable that to a large extent, bias among screening panel
members is an advantage for health care providers. Providers cannot benefit from biased
[Vol. 4:1 19881
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B. Arbitration and the Attainment of Health Care Providers' Goals
Arbitration, on the other hand, has travelled down a somewhat rockier
road than screening panels. Malpractice and arbitration provisions have
come under constitutional attack because the right to trial can be taken
away."5 Yet, even with constitutional problems, arbitration panels, like
pre-trial screening tribunals, have alleviated some aspects of the mal-
practice problem. Basically, arbitration resolves disputes in shorter pe-
riods of time than litigation does,7' and for institutional providers, it
reduces the number of claims filed and improves case processing.",
1. Early Studies. Early studies of arbitration panels in the 1970s
declared that resolving medical malpractice claims in this manner was
a viable alternative.78 In California, the Hospital Arbitration Project was
implemented in eight hospitals with the purposes of disposing of claims
quickly, minimizing awards which would otherwise reach juries, and
reducing the filing of nonmeritorious claims."9 The project was found
to be successful on these counts. The study determined that where
arbitration was used for dispute resolution rather than litigation pro-
ceedings, sixty-three percent fewer claims were filed, and twenty-two
percent of the filed claims were resolved and closed faster.? Furthermore,
the hospitals which used arbitration expended fifty-nine percent less in
defense costs than did hospitals resolving claims through litigation.81
One problem, however, was that even though fewer claims were filed
in arbitration than in litigation, both forums experienced per annum
increases from 1969 through 1975 in the number of claims filed . 2
2. The Sayakan and Ladimer Studies. Subsequent to the California
study by Heintz, more evaluations of the effectiveness of medical
malpractice arbitration were undertaken. One study which gave a positive
review of arbitration was done by Sayakan.8 3 Sayakan concluded through
empirical data that arbitration, both voluntary and mandatory, meets
the demands of reducing the time and costs of resolving medical mal-
panels, however, when accusations of extreme bias become widespread; they can hinder
panel functioning and detract from the mechanism's overall goals.
75. See Morris v. Metriyakool, 418 Mich. 423, 344 N.W.2d 736 (1984). The United
States Supreme Court has addressed this issue in reference to arbitration clauses in
securities disputes. See Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, reh'g denied,
108 S. Ct. 31.
76. See Ladimer, Solomon & Mulvihill, supra fiote 7, at 450.
77. Id. at 454.
78. Heintz, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: A Viable Alternative, 34 ARB. J. 12
(1979).
79. Id. at 13.
80. Id. at 18.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See Sayakan, supra note 27, at 682.
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practice disputes.' As long as some delays (e.g. panel selection) are
eliminated, Sayakan maintains that arbitration proceedings are poten-
tially equitable and fair to all parties.85
A more comprehensive review of the arbitration of malpractice claims
was conducted by Ladimer, Solomon, and Mulvihill in 1981.86 The
authors examined statutory arbitration provisions, as well as private
agreements to arbitrate which arose out of subscriber contracts with
HMO providers like Kaiser.87 The overall conclusion was again positive:
arbitration can provide a prompt forum for the equitable resolution of
physician-patient problems. This is especially true when patients want
to settle a difference with a provider, yet still wish to continue treatment
with that provider.8
Specifically, the authors cited with approval a study which held that
"arbitrators are less likely to find for a claimant if there is no liability
or if there is doubtful liability in contrast to the sympathies of a jury."89
They also concurred with the assessment that the arbitration proceedings
are economical for the defense.9° Also, contrary to some perceptions,
Ladimer and his colleagues found that arbitration can and does accept
large and complex cases, not just simple ones involving smaller injuries.
Finally, they concluded that arbitrators are not reluctant to provide
large awards when appropriate."
As to the overall effect on the American health care system, the
authors declared that resolving medical disputes with arbitration will
be most fitting as new forms of health care delivery like HMO's grow
in prominence. This is because "the contractual nature of arbitration
provides an apt parallel and adjunct to the contractual nature of prepaid
medical service plans. ' 92 For Ladimer, Solomon, and Mulvihill, the key
to arbitration's success is making the system appear efficient and fair
for all parties, so that on the panels no predisposed biases exist for or
against either party.93 The authors emphasize that the informal nature
of the process maintains physician-patient relationships, and the voluntary
character of arbitration removes allegations of duress, coercion, or
adhesion.94
3. Current Evaluations. Current assessments of arbitration usage focus
on voluntary arbitration provisions, as several states have declared man-
84. Id. at 688.
85. Id.
86. See Ladimer, Solomon & Mulvihill, supra note 7.
87. Id. at 434.
88. Id. at 435.
89. Id. at 451.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 452.
92. Id. at 453.
93. Id. at 452-54.
94. Id. at 454.
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datory arbitration to be unconstitutional. 5 This Note examines the
systems in Michigan and New York.
Michigan's Medical Malpractice Arbitration Program96 withstood con-
stitutional challenge in the 1984 Michigan Supreme Court decision of
Morris v. Metriyakool17 The statute essentially requires commercially
insured hospitals to offer arbitration as a dispute resolution mechanism
to patients." The panels consist of three arbitrators: a physician (pref-
erably from the provider-defendant's specialty), an attorney, and "a
person who is neither a doctor, lawyer, nor a representative of a hospital
or insurance company."" The panels also render written opinions which
state the reasoning for finding liability or nonliability, as well as the
amount and kind of award given, if any. 1'"
Generally, the evaluation of Michigan's program concluded 1 that
voluntary binding arbitration is an alternative which decreases the cost
of adjudication. 02 Arbitration in Michigan is viewed as handling less
severe injury claims than those brought in court, thereby discouraging
litigation from those plaintiffs who seek high awards yet have only
minor injury claims. 03 Thus, for Michigan's health care providers, it
would make sense to arbitrate minor claims, and settle the larger claims
which have the strongest indication of provider liability. Moreover, the
speed and flexibility with which claims are resolved by Michigan panels
make arbitration a much preferable alternative to litigation.'"
In New York, malpractice panels were established in 1975 with the
hope of alleviating the state's enormous malpractice problem.0° At that
time, however, panel decisions were only serving as advisory rulings for
future juries, and eventually proved to be rather unsuccessful.'" Con-
sequently, in 1986, amidst the escalation of malpractice insurance pre-
mium rates and the increased number of malpractice suits, the New
York legislature enacted a provision for the resolution of malpracti6e
disputes by arbitration.01
95. See Silas, supra note 34. Examples of states where mandatory arbitration has
been declared unconstitutional include Florida and Pennsylvania.
96. Michigan Medical Malpractice Arbitration Program, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.5040-5065 (West 1987).
97. 418 Mich. 423, 344 N.W.2d 736 (1984).
98. Powsner & Hamermesh, Medical Malpractice Crisis the Second Time Around, 8
J. LEGAL MED. 283, 291 (1987).
99. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.5044(2) (West 1987).
100. See Powsner & Hamermesh, supra note 98, at 293.
101. See id. at 283-304.
102. Id. at 303.
103. Id. at 301.
104. Id. at 298.
105. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 148a (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1988).
106. Note, Arbitration and Medical Malpractice, 11 VT. L. REv. 577, 595 (1986).
107. N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 7550-7566 (McKinney 1988).
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The New York statute provides that three arbiters, an attorney serving
on a full term, and two others selected from a pool of candidates, hear
cases as a panel.' 0' Unlike Michigan, however, New York's arbitration
panel does not include a representative of the medical profession. 09
Furthermore, only claims between providers and enrollees of HMO plans
can be arbitrated."0 Hence, disputes between providers and non-HMO
patients are ineligible for arbitration.
Overall, the arbitration panels in New York have not had a significant
impact during their brief existence."' In deliberating cases, the panels
have lacked the necessary expertise without the presence of health care
professionals, and since the statute applies to HMO participants only,
most New York plaintiffs end up bringing their suits through the largely
ineffective malpractice screening panels."2 Still, the evaluation of New
York's statute considers the arbitration concept to be a speedy, less
costly, and less traumatic forum for malpractice dispute resolution;
perhaps more effective than caps on damage awards and sliding fee
scales."' For New York health care providers, the current arbitration
system appears nonbeneficial, although in time it could become quite
useful. 4
In sum, arbitration provisions, when voluntarily imposed and supported
by competent panels, are effective in reducing the volume of claims
filed and the overall costs of dispute resolution. Health care providers
should thereby benefit from arbitration, provided all parties, including
providers, respect panel determinations on liability and damages.
IV. IMPROVING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
EFFECTIVENESS FOR HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS
Despite the positive effects which screening panels and arbitration
provisions have brought in solving the medical malpractice problem in
this country, several jurisdictions are far from reaching the primary
goals of reducing the volume of malpractice litigation and decreasing
awards given to plaintiffs. The following suggestions encompass the
prevailing views on reforming screening panels and arbitration.
108. See Note, supra note 106, at 597.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 596.
111. Id. at 598.
112. Id. at 599.




A. Suggestions for Screening Panel Reform
The major problems with screening panels center around biased panels
and delays in panel formation and decision-making. When the process
takes too long to resolve the dispute or appears inherently unfair, both
sides become frustrated, and hence, desire the more familiar litigation
process. To address these problems, Carlin has suggested that panels
should be monitored for bias, and that panel chairpersons be given
broader powers so the hearings can proceed smoothly toward prompt
completion.15 Carlin also advocates choosing panel chairs who are dis-
position-oriented, so as to strongly impress upon the parties the impor-
tance of settling or abandoning claims.16
Another important reform which should improve the effectiveness of
screening panels is the requirement that panel systems be mandatory,"7
and that panel decisions possess some "teeth" in terms of discouraging
future litigation."8 More parties, especially providers, need to be involved
in the screening panel process, and once in that process, they must
abide by panel determinations when the particular circumstances dic-
tate.19 If this objective can be achieved, double litigation, which exists
in states like Maryland,'2 can be substantially reduced or eliminated.
This result would also serve to further reduce the court system's caseload.
B. Suggestions for Arbitration Reform
Reforms in arbitration are similarly focused on reducing the biases
and delays inherent in many arbitration jurisdictions. The process must
be fine-tuned to provide for efficient results, principally through better
panel selection procedures, a larger pool of panelists to choose from,
and adherence to time guidelines given by the panel chairpersons.'2'
Arbitration panels must also be made more accessible to both patients
and providers, as is the suggestion for New York." Finally, all parties
must be willing to work with one another, and remove any remnants
of the adversarial system when resolving their medical malpractice
dispute.
115. See P. CARLIN, supra note 1, at 41.
116. Id. at 40.
117. Id. at 39.
118. See C. PHILIP & R. FAUST, supra note 39, at 40.
119. Circumstances where panel determinations may not provide for complete party
adherence are those in which the right to a jury trial is brought into serious question.
120. See Silas, supra note 34.
121. See Sayakan, supra note 27, at 689.
122. See Note, supra note 106, at 599. One possible suggestion to increase the
accessibility of arbitration panels in this context would be express provisions for arbitration
in HMO contracts. Constitutional questions, however, are potentially implicated when
such provisions are enforced.
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V. CONCLUSION
For health care providers, the future of alternative dispute resolution
in the area of medical malpractice appears bright. In light of the success
and positive growth of screening panels and arbitration provisions, more
jurisdictions should consider implementing these mechanisms when bat-
tling the malpractice problem. Incorporating the necessary reforms into
the screening panel and arbitration mechanisms will help further solidify
the structure of medical malpractice claim resolution. The end result
will be a conventional legal system less burdened by malpractice disputes,
which creates for other litigants easier access to the courts of justice.
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